Earning Respect by Flogging

In the report issued by the Institute of Contemporary Development titled "21st-Century Russia: Reflections on an Attractive Tomorrow," the authors call for "strong steps against the bureaucracy hindering modernization." President Dmitry Medvedev tried taking the first of those steps in his heavy-hitting speech before the Interior Ministry, but the effect was less than thrilling. 

I admit that Medvedev's decision to dismiss 17 generals with a single stroke of his presidential pen seemed to me a sufficiently drastic move to convince Russians that their leader is serious about reform. But subsequent events quickly dispelled that illusion. During a visit to a Moscow editorial office, I asked what the staff thought of Medvedev's dismissals. In place of the expected comments about how he is getting tough with law enforcement officials, I heard nothing but complaints about how Olympic judges had shortchanged Russia's favorite figure skater, Yevgeny Plushenko, by only awarding him a silver medal. I ended up having to explain to them the whole story about the generals and the police from beginning to end.

"Well," the chief of the PR department responded, "if the president had wanted to send a strong signal showing that he was serious about reform, he chose the wrong time to do it."

That reaction made me realize just how important and difficult it is to send a strong signal - the results of which ultimately determine whether a Russian leader succeeds or fails. The 19th-century Russian satirist Mikhail Saltykov-Shchedrin was the first to remark upon this fact. In one of his fairy tales, a bear that became lord of the animal kingdom kicks off his new reign by catching and eating a tiny finch that happens to fly past. Having expected an act of savage cruelty from their master, the rest of the animals are deeply disappointed in this lackluster display of force and nothing the bear does later - no matter how atrocious - can save his reputation.

As political analyst Dmitry Furman once quipped: "The best way to engage a Russian in a constructive dialogue with the authorities is to flog him." With great personal respect and growing alarm we watched how former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev categorically refused to flog his citizens, even when they clearly deserved it, and he quickly fell out of favor with the Russian people.

Gorbachev was succeeded by President Boris Yeltsin, who only tormented the Russian people throughout most of his term. But Russia's rich historical experience has taught the average person to differentiate between a flogging administered for the common good and an execution intended to satisfy a leader's personal ambitions. That is why the "mean-spirited" Yeltsin was even less popular than the "kind-hearted" Gorbachev.

Then along came Vladimir Putin with his classic "take-charge" approach. After he established his authority during the second Chechen war, he avoided committing atrocities and managed to ensure that people finally received their meager salaries and pensions on time. Those policies are what made Putin the country's national leader.

In contrast, Medvedev, who tried to be tough by cracking down on generals, got off to a false start. But fate has given him a second chance. After Russia's poor performance in the Olympic Games, the people are united in their hunger to see not just a proper flogging but a veritable bloodbath for the country's sports officials. Judging by the fact that Medvedev on Monday called on the country's Olympic bureaucrats to resign or face being fired in disgrace, he is intent not to miss this opportunity. This is how Medvedev is entering his third year as a great democrat and modernizer.

Alexei Pankin is editor of WAN-IFRA-GIPP Magazine for publishing business professionals.

The League of Democracies

Although it has been several weeks since the Institute of Contemporary Development published its report titled "21st-Century Russia: Reflections on an Attractive Tomorrow," it continues to be a source of heightened discussion. One of the most sensational projections in the report is that Russia, once modernized, can become a member of NATO.

It is obvious that the report was projecting many years into the future and wasn't referring to Russia today, whose leaders never tire of warning about Western democracy and NATO expansion and whose newly released military doctrine places NATO as the largest external military danger. Moreover, Russia does not even come close to meeting NATO's political standards. Take, for example, the bloated Federal Security Service that simultaneously battles nonexistent spies, economic crimes and terrorism. Look at the country's police force, which citizens fear more than they fear hardened criminals.

In reality, of course, the main problem in Russian-NATO relations is not the danger of a military confrontation but the "values gap" that threatens Russia more than anything else. The Kremlin has stated dozens of times in many different forms that it does not intend to structure Russia's life according to foolish Western concepts such as the rule of law, respect for civil liberties and human rights because the formerly Soviet population is not mature enough for freedom. Vladimir Putin once said the country needs 20 years of "manual control" before that could happen.

This mind-set was the main reason why Putin was so angry after Georgia and Ukraine announced their desire to join NATO several years ago. The prospect of "NATO bases" in Georgia and Ukraine armed with U.S. midrange missiles (which were destroyed 20 years ago as a result of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987) was not the real problem for Putin, of course. What stung Putin the most was that Tbilisi and Kiev made the unexpected claim that their countries subscribed to Western standards of democracy and values and were committed to developing those institutions further as a condition for joining NATO. This was a firm rejection of Putin's "manual control" model.

Moscow insists that NATO should transform itself from a military bloc into a political alliance. But that process started a long time ago. Contrary to Kremlin allegations, NATO has not increased its military potential by granting membership to former Soviet satellite states. The thousands of dilapidated, rusty, 50-year-old, Soviet-made tanks located in Poland, Romania and Bulgaria do nothing to increase NATO's military potential. It would take hundreds of billions of dollars to bring the armies of Eastern European member states up to modern standards, and NATO does not have those resources at its disposal. That is why when Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic states sought NATO membership, the alliance radically lowered its military requirements for new members - for example, in these countries only one regiment or battalion needed to conform to modern requirements, and only those units would be used in actual fighting.

The true "NATO expansion" today is not defined in terms of tanks, bases or battalions but in terms of the alliance's political expansion - the list of requirements that would-be members must have functioning democratic institutions, a real separation of powers, transparent military budgets adopted by the parliament and civil control over the military. The authors of the Institute of Contemporary Development report believe that post-modernization Russia could, in theory, conform to those democratic standards. If NATO would ever accept Russia as a full member, it would be a firm recognition that Russia had successfully carried out democratic reforms and has joined the league of democracies.

In terms of national security, NATO membership would also guarantee Russia protection from external threats, including the hypothetical threat from China and the very real threat from Islamic extremists, drug trafficking and piracy. The report predicts that the first step toward forming a true partnership between Russia and NATO will be working together in a joint peacekeeping operation in a developing country.

Alexander Golts is deputy editor of the online newspaper Yezhednevny Zhurnal.